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Introduction  
The investment plan for Europe was launched 
last year by the European Commission to 
provide public support for economically viable 
projects that could not have otherwise been 
supported because of a lack of interest from 
private investors. One year on, the EU executive 
heralds it as a major success. According to the 
latest data, the plan is on track to reach its goal 
of mobilising investments and the Commission 
has already proposed to extend it beyond 2018. 
The aim of European Fund for Strategic 
Investment (EFSI), run by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), is to finance projects 
that would have been deemed too risky for 
financing under existing instruments. EFSI 
reduces that risk by proposing a public 
guarantee for the projects, thus encouraging 
private investors to get on board. The fund 
currently includes a €16 billion guarantee from 
the EU and a further €5 billion from the EIB. 
This theoretically allows the EIB to issue bonds 
for three times this amount and use the cash to 
co-finance projects in partnership with private 
investors so that every euro spent by the 
investment fund attracts an additional €15 from 
companies and public authorities, leading to an 
overall investment of €315 billion. 
One year on, did the results meet the 
expectations? 
As of mid-October 2016, 361 projects have 
been approved for a total of €24.8 billion from 
EFSI financing. These projects are mobilising 
around €140 billion of investment. As the EFSI 
is about the hit the halfway mark, small- and 
medium-size enterprises (SMEs), research, 
development and innovation and energy are 
taking the lion’s share of the investments with 
around 65% of the total. 
The Juncker Plan – only for the largest 
Member States ? 
One year after its launch, the Juncker Plan has 
reached 27 of the EU’s 28 Member States – with 
Cyprus being the exception .  
However, the majority of the approved projects 
has been launched in the most developed and 
largest EU countries, namely France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Indeed, 
the first year of the Juncker Plan has largely 
A few weeks after the presentation by 
the European Commission of ‘Juncker 
Plan 2.0’, it is high time to look back at 
what has so far been achieved by the 
earlier version of the Juncker Plan – and 
how well it has worked for Belgium. 
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benefited the larger and western-most countries 
of the EU. 
One explanation could be that biggest Member 
States benefit from a larger technical capacity. 
Also, the short time frame (one year) means 
most of the projects currently signed with the 
EIB were prepared well before the launch of the 
Juncker Plan, limiting the capacity of the 
advisory hub to support project development.  
Finally, the structure of the fund and its reliance 
on existing national promotion banks as relays 
means that countries with well-developed 
financial infrastructures and strong national 
promotion banks will most likely benefit more 
quickly than the rest of Europe. 
This highlights one of the weaknesses of the 
plan. The loose definition of its goals and 
objectives make it an instrument very much 
reliant on the pre-existing pipeline of projects. 
The Commission has voluntarily excluded all 
demand-shaping requirements (such as projects 
compatible with the Paris Agreement or with 
high social value added) from the regulation. It 
seems, however, that this will change in the 
EFSI 2.0 – a welcome change as otherwise the 
fund risks guaranteeing projects that will not 
provide the maximum value to investors in the 
long term. 
The multiplier effect, a good surprise? 
The multiplier effect – the capacity to attract 
private investments through public intervention 
– is central to evaluating the success of the plan. 
‘Junckernomics’ focus very much on bringing 
private investment back to Europe while 
keeping public spending in check. The plan is 
the crystallisation of this train of thought: no 
wonder the plan is named after the 
Commission’s president. Politically, this 
Commission will largely be judged by the 
success of the Juncker Plan. 
Many questioned the capacity of the plan to 
leverage private investment. Even the very 
influential Bruegel think tank raised doubts 
about this ambitious leverage factor of 15, given 
that the EIB usually leverages three times the 
public share in a project.i  Adding to this 
scepticism, the risk profile of the projects under 
EFSI – which should have been higher than 
under classic EIB financing – were likely to sap 
the appetite of private financiers. 
One year on, the multiplier effect has proved a 
pleasant surprise for the plan. 
One example has been the EIB-supported third-
party financing companies for the energy 
renovation of private dwellings in France. This 
is an activity that is difficult to initiate, because 
the banking sector is now almost entirely absent. 
The estimates are made project by project and 
based on actual results. The leverage effect can 
vary highly from one project to another. 
Changes in governance, towards a more 
open and democratic tool? 
The issue of the reluctance of the EIB in terms 
of project selection was also debatable. The 
institution, which can borrow at extremely 
attractive rates thanks to its triple A rating, could 
be criticised for the lack of additionality in the 
projects selected. It has certainly been 
established that the projects benefiting from 
EFSI financing are not additional enough to 
entirely fulfil the criteria set out in the 
legislation. 
This profile is at odds with the objective of the 
Juncker Plan, which was precisely intended to 
support projects in need of funding due to their 
lack of profitability or lack of attraction to 
private investors. The Juncker Plan was meant 
to finance riskier projects. 
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For 2015, projects financed under the Juncker 
Plan were selected by the governing board of 
the EIB and approved by the European 
Commission. The launch of the plan took place 
before the formal establishment of the steering 
committee, which will meet for the first time in 
late January, and will be officially in charge of 
validating projects. 
Any new validation process should also include 
the European Parliament. Indeed, the chairman 
of the steering committee and of EFSI will 
report every six months to the European 
Parliament. But is it the role of the European 
Parliament to control the selection process? 
The Juncker Plan, only for riskier 
investments? 
In a departure from its earlier conservative 
investment policy, the EIB’s investment council 
is now actively seeking riskier projects to 
finance. It is clear that some projects financed 
under EFSI would have been financed anyway 
by the EIB. The risk profile of these projects 
matches the level of risks the EIB is usually 
ready to support. 
This is one of the direct consequences of 
making the fund such a iconic item for this 
Commission’s term. The quantitative target, 
widely publicised, is a goal the EIB is committed 
to, and will be held accountable for. The drive 
to meet this quantitative target, in the case of 
EFSI, has prevailed over the additionality of the 
projects selected. 
The Commission has recognised this weakness 
by reinforcing the additionality criteria in the 
proposal for a revised EFSI regulation in 
Juncker Plan 2.0. 
Belgium, average student of the Juncker 
Plan? 
Firstly, it is important to remember the 
investment gap in Belgium. Despite a sharp 
decline in growth in 2009 following the financial 
crisis, Belgium has been relatively resilient. The 
share of investment in overall GDP grew less 
sharply than in other countries in the eurozone: 
24.3% of GDP in 2008 to 22.3% in 2013, 
against 23% and 19.6% respectively in the euro 
area.  
According to the Commission, the main 
challenge for Belgium in the field of investment 
lies in the public sector. Over the years, public 
investment fell to 1.6% of GDP – almost the 
lowest percentage of all EU Member States. 
Since 1980 there has been a decline in public 
investment. This long period of limited 
expenditure on public investment projects has 
had a very negative effect on the long-term 
potential of the economy. 
However, there is a need for public investment: 
investments in national energy infrastructure 
and interconnections with neighbouring energy 
markets would improve the security of the 
energy supply market and benefit the economy 
as a whole. 
Three Belgian projects are already supported by 
the Juncker Plan to the tune of €380 million. 
They are expected to trigger a final €1,800 
million of investment and create more than 
3,200 jobs. These projects are two off-shore 
wind farms and an investment fund specialising 
in the rehabilitation of polluted industrial sites, 
the Ginkgo Multi-Strategy Fund. The 
shareholders are private and public investors 
including the EIB.  
Moreover, two others projects are already 
approved but not yet signed. One with 
SONACA SA, this project covers investments in 
research, development and innovation (RDI), 
the other is a project of construction and 
operation of an offshore wind park. 
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It is worth asking if the Ginkgo Multi-Strategy 
Fund really needed the Juncker Plan as it had 
already benefited from EIB support in 2010, 
before the plan was launched. 
More generally, one may also wonder whether 
the Juncker Plan should not support more 
innovative projects, more transnational projects 
and finally more projects in countries in 
economic difficulty. 
In addition to the infrastructure component, 192 
Belgian SMEs have benefited from the Juncker 
Plan, including 100 projects in Flanders and 92 
in Wallonia. Of these 92 projects in Wallonia, 77 
relate to classical economics and 15 are projects 
involving innovative economics. Of the 77 
classical projects, about a third could not be 
financed without the Juncker Plan. Another 
third would have required more capital 
contribution, and the last third would have had 
to be scaled back to a less ambitious scope due 
to the lack of financial support. 
European Investment Fund financing under the 
EFSI for the six approved agreements with 
intermediary banks or funds amounts to €57.6 
million. This is expected to trigger €684.5 
million in investments and benefit 2,021 SMEs 
and start-ups. Examples of the intermediaries 
include Sowalfin S.A., Participatiefonds 
Vlaanderen N.V., ING Belgium S.A./N.V. and 
Belfius. 
If we analyse the report published by the 
Commission, we observe that the public sector 
was one of the biggest investment gaps. If we 
assess the Belgian projects funded by the 
Juncker Plan, we find that most of them are 
private initiatives.  
The main obstacle the Juncker Plan faces in 
delivering on its full potential is inconsistency 
between policies. If the aim of the Juncker Plan 
is to facilitate investments, the way these 
investments are treated by the ESA 2010 rules 
hinders them dramatically in Belgium. The 
European System of National and Regional 
Accounts (ESA 2010) requires Member States to 
treat public investment as one-off expenditure. 
If a project includes public investment of €3 
million over three years, the rules require 
Belgium to report €3 million of investment in 
year one rather than €1 million each year. 
Considering the limitation imposed by the 
Commission on budget balances, this 
accounting requirement seriously hinders the 
capacity of Belgium to scale up public 
investments.  
At the same time, the Commission recognises in 
its analysis of the economy of Belgium that the 
country is suffering from a lack of public 
investment, which hinders growth and jobs 
creation. A more consistent approach focused 
on both the right diagnosis and on creating 
sufficient flexibility in the rules to deliver the 
objective would help the economy and bring 
more prosperity to the European citizen. The 
solution would be to apply the same treatment 
as that afforded to private sector investments, 
allowing for the amortisation of the investments 
over their length. 
Conclusion 
EFSI 1.0 has been placed very high on the 
agenda by this Commission, and it has proved 
both a blessing and a curse. On the plus side, 
the plan has been set up in record time, calling 
to mind the notion of Member States addressing 
their Christmas shopping list to the Commission 
and providing the institution with a solid list of 
new projects to support. The downside is that 
the EIB and the European Commission have 
both emphasised the need to reach a 
quantitative target – widely publicised but 
dwarfing the real added value of the fund in 
comparison with the usual EIB funding.  
Lessons have been learned for EFSI 2.0. 
Scrutiny of the additionality the projects has 
been reinforced and the advisory hub will be 
  
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
5 
 
tasked with proactively seeking projects for 
financing. Coming a few months after the EU 
ratified the Paris Agreement, the announcement 
that projects contributing to the goal of the 
agreement will be prioritised is also welcome. 
The Commission now needs to focus on 
structural reforms – starting at home – for the 
plan to deliver its full potential and boost 
investments in Europe. As shown in the case of 
Belgium’s problematic accounting rules, a better 
alignment between European Semester 
recommendations and the projects selected, 
together with a revision of rules currently 
hindering investments is the right formula for 
boosting investments in Europe. Indeed, so far, 
the public investment gap – the main investment 
gap in Belgium – has not been resolved by the 
Juncker Plan and will not be in the near future. 
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